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Cambodia's 1998

The

Elections

Democratic

Failure of

Consolidation

Peter M. Manikas
Eric Bjornlund

This article examines

why Cambodia 's

transition to

democracy faltered in the
in Cambodia period
two "democratic" elections.

years that followed the United Nations Transitional Authority
despite the international community's assistance to

Cambodia's

parliamentary elections on July 26, 1998, were supposed to consolidate

the political gains

made

since 1991,

ended the nation's twelve-year

civil war.

when
More

the signing of the Paris Peace

than five years earlier, in

May

Accords
1993,

by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC)
held at a cost of $ 1 .5 billion and the lives of seventy-eight people deushered in a coalition government
ployed to Cambodia under UNTAC auspices
elections organized

—

—

1

had been expected

to establish a legal

and

framework

political

ernance of the country. While the election was largely hailed as a success
that coalition unraveled over the next five years.

By

that

for the democratic govat the time,

July 1997, a violent coup had over-

turned the elected government and the nation once again confronted

civil

violence and

international isolation.

The 1998

elections, like the

mend Cambodia's
it

did

when

now

looks

much

as

emerged from the UNTAC period. The Cambodian People's Party (CPP).
Vietnamese communism, is in control of the civil bureaucracy, security

and electronic media; key opposition leaders returned from exile only recently

and are participating
activists are far

The

five years earlier, failed to

it

with roots in
forces,

UN-supervised elections

deep-seated political divisions. Indeed, the nation

from

in a fragile coalition

government. The human rights of political

secure.

Paris Peace Agreements

and the 1993

Elections

Perhaps no country in the twentieth century has suffered more turmoil and unremitting
violence than Cambodia. The nation has seen
past

fifty years.

little

peace, and no stability, during the

Since the end of the Second World War, each of Cambodia's govern-

ments has been an abrupt departure from the one

that

preceded

it:

in

1953 the French

Peter M. Manikas, a senior associate at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and its representative in Cambodia from May 1996 through May 1997, was a
member of the international delegation to observe Cambodia's July 1998 elections. Eric
Bjornlund, a senior associate and director of Asia programs at the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs, also participated in NDI's international observer delegation.
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was replaced by the monarchy of King Norodom Sihanouk; the king
was overthrown by his prime minister, Lon Nol, in 1970; the Lon Nol regime was
toppled by the Khmer Rouge in 1975; the Maoist Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, were
conquered by the invading Vietnamese army in 1978; and in 1991, the Vietnameseinstalled regime, after fighting a protracted civil war against the Khmer Rouge as well
as against the royalist and nationalist forces encamped along the Thai border, was recolonial regime

placed by the United Nations-sponsored transitional government.

The Vietnamese invasion of December 1978 installed the People's Republic of
Kampuchea (PRK), which faced a continuing struggle against the Khmer Rouge. The
PRK, which consisted mostly of former Khmer Rouge cadre who had defected to Vietnam to escape the purges launched by Pol Pot shortly after taking power, was led by
Heng Samrin and, after 1985, by Hun Sen. Defeated in battle, the Pol Pot-led guerrillas
had fled into hiding along the Thai-Cambodia frontier. In 1982, the Khmer Rouge entered into an alliance with the royalist National Front for an independent, neutral,

peaceful, and cooperative

Cambodia (known by

headed by King Sihanouk, and

later

by

its

French acronym,

his son, Prince Ranariddh.

A

FUNCINPEC),
third alliance

member, the republican Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), was led
by Son Sann, a highly respected former prime minister in Sihanouk's 1960s government. Each of the warring factions secured the backing of its Cold War patrons: the
USSR supporting its ally Vietnam, and therefore the PRK; China backing the Khmer
Rouge; and the Western countries, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, assisting FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF.
The Cold War, still raging in the early and mid-1980s, stymied occasional attempts
to bring an end to the conflict. The thaw of the late 1980s, however, finally led to a
breakthrough. The Vietnamese withdrew their forces in 1989, and the PRK changed its
name to the State of Cambodia (SOC), preparing for its new non-Communist image.
That same year, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, along with
other interested parties, initiated the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia.
The 1991 Paris Peace Agreement obligated the United States, Japan, China, and the
other signatories of the 1991 Paris Accords to support the struggle for democracy in
Cambodia. These agreements required Cambodia to respect human rights as enshrined
in the principal international instruments on human rights. The Paris Accords called for
Cambodia to follow "a system of liberal democracy on the basis of pluralism." The
accords also mandated "periodic and genuine elections
with a requirement that
electoral procedures provide a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in
.

.

.

the electoral process." 2

The agreement established the

largest

and most costly peacekeeping force

history of the United Nations: the United Nations Transitional Authority in

UNTAC

was

to supervise the administration

in the

Cambodia.

of the country until a democratically

Assembly formed a new government and ratified a national constiWith a budget of more than $2 billion (of which $1.5 billion was actually

elected Constituent
tution.

spent),

3

UNTAC

consisted of

people serving in

its

military

UNTAC's mandate was

more

than 20,000 foreign personnel, including 15,000

component.

a broad one.

It

was given

"all

powers necessary

implementation" of the comprehensive agreement. In the military area,

to ensure

UNTAC's

spe-

was to "supervise, monitor, and verify" the cease-fire, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the cantonment and disarmament of the four warring factions: the
SOC, the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, and the KPNLF. 4

cific task
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were extensive. They included supervising the
and implementing programs to protect

civil responsibilities, too,

repatriation of refugees, conducting elections,

human
trative

UNTAC

rights.

was

also responsible for exercising direct control over adminis-

bodies in the areas of foreign

and public information. Additionally,
tive public activities. Its

affairs, national defense, public security, finance,

environment conducive to free and

cal

May

During the
percent of

to "supervise or control" other, less sensi-

"ensure a neutral politi-

to

fair elections."

23-28, 1993, elections, nearly 4 million Cambodians, almost 90

registered voters,

all

was

it

fundamental objective, though, was

went

to the polls. Representatives

were elected on a

proportional basis, with each of the nation's twenty-one provinces serving as an election
district.

UN

The

from more than

established

,400 stationary and mobile polling stations, and personnel

1

forty countries supervised the voting.

nongovernmental organizations (NGO)s

UNTAC,

working with national

conducted an extensive civic education cam-

,

paign to assure citizens that their vote would be secret. To protect the secrecy of the
ballot at the village level, counting

was conducted

from several villages were commingled
Expectations that the

to

Khmer Rouge would

Intimidation and violence, however, did

at provincial centers

where

ballots

obscure voting patterns in any given locality.

mar

interrupt the voting did not materialize.

the campaign.

The CPP was accused of
fair media access, and

intimidating candidates and voters, denying opposition parties

other forms of harassment. Several opposition activists, primarily

FUNCINPEC

sup-

were murdered during the campaign. Most of the political violence was attributed to the Khmer Rouge, but a substantial portion of the violence also was found to be
5
the responsibility of the CPP.

porters,

To some

extent, the violence that flared

FUNCINPEC

testing parties.

was

the responsibility of

dices against the resident Vietnamese population,
try for generations.

As

all

the major con-

candidates, for example, also appealed to people's preju-

many

of

whom

community was

a result, the Vietnamese

had been

in the

coun-

also the target of politi-

cal violence.

Although twenty parties registered, only four of them won
Assembly. Of the 120 seats

Cambodian People's

the total vote); the
eral

in the assembly,

Democratic Party (BLDP), the

much

smaller party, Molinaka,

The euphoria
pected loss led

tion against him.

counted, and

that

CPP

won one

);

and the Buddhist Lib-

arm of the KPNLF, won 10

(3.7 percent).

A

seat.

election, however,

soon subsided. His unex-

to reject the results, claiming that the

Rumors of a

seats in the Constituent

obtained 58 (45.5 percent of

Party 51 (38.2 percent

civilian

accompanied the

Hun Sen

FUNCINPEC

UN had rigged

the elec-

possible coup appeared even as the ballots were being

leaders threatened secession in eight eastern provinces bordering on

Vietnam. The pending

crisis

was averted only when King Sihanouk brokered a power-

sharing agreement.

A

coalition

come,

at least

mained

government was formed which,

if it

did not reflect the election's out-

mirrored the realities of political power. After the election, the

in control

CPP

re-

of the civil bureaucracy, police, and other key components of the

state apparatus. Therefore,

FUNCINPEC

needed the CPP's cooperation

ern effectively. In addition, Cambodia's Constitution required that the

in order to

gov-

new government

be approved by two-thirds of the National Assembly. Clearly, a compromise would be
needed to form the government. Consequently, the CPP and FUNCINPEC agreed to
share the top government positions. Although

FUNCINPEC won

a plurality of the par-

liamentary seats, each of the eighteen government ministries would be headed by

148

co-ministers, one from each party, or by a minister and a secretary of state from differ-

The government that emerged was quickly termed a government of national
At the time, the new government was seen as the product of a successful

ent parties.

reconciliation.

international intervention.

National reconciliation was needed because long-standing animosities continued to

Many still viewed the CPP as a "puppet" of the Vietnamese and
Khmer culture. The National Front FUNCINPEC, on the other

divide the country.

therefore a threat to

hand, suffered under several handicaps despite the nation's respect for the king, and by
extension for Prince Ranariddh.

Many

of the party's

members of Parliament (MPs) were

seen as venal opportunists. Resentment lingered because several

were allowed

FUNCINPEC

officials

by the United States or
the minds of many Cambodi-

to retain their foreign passports, usually issued

France, which they obtained during their years in exile. In
ans, these links with foreign countries cast doubt

on the MPs' commitment

to

improving

the lives of ordinary Cambodians.

As
clear.

new government assumed office, UNTAC's legacy was becoming increasingly
civil war had ended, the Khmer Rouge was politically marginalized, and

the

The

375,000 refugees had returned. With the high

rate of registration and voter turnout, the
was technically a success. Furthermore, UNTAC had sponsored dozens of new
nongovernmental organizations engaged in monitoring human rights, civic education,

election

and social

ernment

services. In addition, several

newspapers were operating free of direct gov-

control.

UNTAC,

however, failed to accomplish several important tasks. During the election,

Battambang, Siem Reap, and

in provinces such as

Kompong

Thorn,

UNTAC

had been

unable to prevent considerable harassment and violence. This included the arrest and

bombing of party offices, and the execution of oppowas to repeat itself five years later. Also, the military
opposing sides had been neither demobilized nor disarmed. While the
former warring factions were incorporated into an army under unified

intimidation of party activists, the
sition supporters, a pattern that

forces of the
forces of the

command,

troops, in fact,

were widely known

UNTAC

to

remained loyal

to their

be aligned with either

also failed to fulfill

its

principal

former political leaders, and divisions

FUNCINPEC

mandate

or the CPP.

to "ensure a neutral political envi-

ronment." Throughout the campaign period, and after the election as well, the

maintained firm control of the

civil

These instruments of

state

military.

period to retain

The

its

much

bureaucracy, judiciary, police, and

power were used by

the

CPP

CPP

of the

during the election

hold on government.

Coalition Unravels

Cambodia made some

progress in the early part of its experiment with democracy. The
newly seated Constituent Assembly, for instance, transformed itself into a legislative
chamber, adopted a new Constitution, and passed much-needed laws spurring foreign
investment. The government

made improvements

advances

in the areas of education

ments

Cambodian

in

civil society,

in the country's infrastructure

emergence of strong and nongovernmental organizations.

human

improve the
of women, and educate the public about democracy.
actively sought to strengthen

After the

UNTAC

and

and health care. There were also significant developmarked by the growth of independent media and the
rights,

A

number of

legal system,

these

NGOs

enhance the

status

period, however, turmoil within the parties clouded the political
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power

struggle within the

Cambodian People's

Party, for

example, was

reportedly behind an attempted coup d'etat in July 1994. In 1995, the Buddhist Liberal

Democratic Party splintered. Hun Sen's

CPP backed

a

new

faction of

BLDP

led by

information minister Ieng Mouly.

By

FUNCINPEC, weakening the party as a
Sam Rainsy, for example, who served as finance minister, was widely
one of FUNCINPEC's most capable members. An outspoken critic of the

1995, problems had emerged within

coalition partner.

regarded as

widespread corruption that infected
his post

and expelled from the

(KNP), subsequently renamed the

Sam

1998 elections. Following

and

FUNCINPEC

in France,

Sirivudh,

all

two of the

party's

removed from

Rainsy's ouster, Prince Sirivudh, the king's half brother

secretary-general,

accused of plotting

levels of government, Rainsy v/as

He later established the Khmer Nation Party
Sam Rainsy Party, an effective competitor in the

party.

was forced out of

to assassinate

Hun

most competent

the party

and pushed

into exile

Sen. With the departure of Rainsy and

political operatives

were unavailable

to

help the increasingly beleaguered and outmaneuvered Prince Ranariddh.

During

this time, the fragile coalition

prime ministers led

begin to unravel. Animosity between the co-

to political stalemate,

which prevented

taking the political and social reforms needed to establish
judicial institutions required

Supreme Council of

by the Constitution

the Magistracy

—

— were never

the government from underits

legitimacy. Independent

the Constitutional Council and

established.

The CPP retained full
Endemic corrup-

control of the judiciary, local administration, and the security forces.
tion persisted as well.

Likewise, newspapers
editors imprisoned.

critical

of the

CPP

or the government were closed and their

Between 1993 and 1997,

several journalists

were prosecuted,

killed,

or injured, apparently the result of politically motivated attacks. In addition, opposition
political party

workers were threatened and harassed.

March 1997, an apparent assassination attempt on Sam Rainsy at a public rally in
front of the National Assembly in Phnom Penh killed at least sixteen people and injured
more than one hundred. The attack, widely attributed to Hun Sen's bodyguard detail,
was a turning point. To many observers, the political impasse now seemed increasingly
In

likely to

be resolved by violence.

The following month, Hun Sen made an attempt
by encouraging

FUNCINPEC MPs

to defect to the

to divide the opposition internally

CPP. The

returned to the National Front
increase

its

numbers

in

CPP

reportedly used in-

was not long before most
Nevertheless, the CPP had managed to

timidation and bribes to recruit the dozen defectors, but

FUNCINPEC.
now had

Parliament and

it

an effective majority.

It still fell

short,

however, of the two-thirds majority necessary to adopt constitutional amendments. 6

The upcoming 1998

FUNCINPEC

had

little

elections

offices in the countryside

sought a

new

were also generating increased tensions. Realizing

that

influence over local administration, and that control over local

would be important

district-level

in the parliamentary elections,

Ranariddh

power-sharing agreement. The parties failed to reach an

accord, each blaming the other for bargaining in bad

Although required by the Paris Peace Accords, the

faith.

parties never merged their miliarmy and maintained large armed militias and "bodyguard units." Both the CPP and FUNCINPEC competed to recruit defecting Khmer
Rouge soldiers to their sides. Independent judicial institutions mandated by the Constitution were not established. Even before the July 1997 coup, many Cambodian citizens
questioned their government's commitment to democracy, had lost faith in the

tary forces into a single national

150

democratic process, and doubted the possibility of meaningful elections. Despite these

1997 the principles of a multiparty government stood.

trends, however, until July

July 1997

On

Coup and Aftermath

July 5, 1997, second prime minister

Cambodia's

first

For two days forces loyal
coup,

Hun Sen

military, police,

Hun Sen launched

a coup d'etat against

prime minister, Prince Ranariddh, overturning the lawful government.

Hun Sen

to

routed troops loyal to Prince Ranariddh. After the

quickly consolidated his power by disarming and detaining nearly

and intelligence forces loyal

infrastructures of parties

opposed

to the

CPP

to the prince

and dismantling the

throughout the country. In the days follow-

ing the coup, dozens of Ranariddh's key supporters and other

were

killed,

grounds of the ministry. Offices of parties opposed

exile in

to France, while

FUNCINPEC

loyalists

Ho

Sok,

who was

to the

CPP

were sacked and burned.

including senior interior ministry official

Meanwhile, Prince Ranariddh fled

all

political

many of

executed on the

his party's stalwarts

found

Bangkok.

In August,

Hun Sen

deposed the prince as

and namedHun Sen's

consolidated his control

ally,

foreign minister

military court subsequently charged

the outlawed

when

the National

Assembly formally

co-prime minister, stripped him of his parliamentary immunity,

Khmer Rouge

Ung

Huot, as the

new

first

prime minister.

A

Ranariddh with smuggling arms and colluding with

guerrilla group.

For months after the coup, fighting between forces of the Cambodian People's Party

government and troops loyal

to Prince

Ranariddh continued along the northwestern

border between Cambodia and Thailand.

gee camps

An

estimated 60,000 Cambodians fled to refu-

in Thailand.

Prince Ranariddh and other exiled political leaders formed the Union of Cambodian
Democrats (UCD). FUNCINPEC joined the alliance with three other political parties
opposed to the current government: the Khmer Nation Party of Sam Rainsy, the BLDP
led by Son Sann, and the Khmer Neutral Party, a small party that had no seats in Parlia-

ment.
In retrospect, the July coup should not have been too surprising. Other coup attempts
had been made between 1993 and 1997. In addition, the previous year had seen the
rivalry between Hun Sen and Ranariddh grow increasingly intense and militant. Beginning in August 1996, the two co-prime ministers competed fiercely for the allegiance of

Khmer Rouge defectors. The first to desert was Ieng Sary, Pol Pot's brother-in-law,
who was largely regarded as being very near the top of the Khmer Rouge hierarchy.
Hun Sen prevailed, offering Ieng Sary and his followers a royal pardon and effective
control of Pailin. However, the defections of other Khmer Rouge leaders continued, as
did the competition for their support. Hun Sen and Ranariddh dispatched emissaries to
the

To the co-prime ministers, the dissidents potenand experienced guerilla fighters and perhaps whatever funds
from illegal gem and timber operations had been stashed in Swiss bank accounts. 7 In
November 1996 and February 1997, FUNCINPEC and CPP military units in Battambang clashed. Although the skirmishes were brief, they served as a reminder, if one was
lure defectors to their respective sides.
tially offered disciplined

needed, that the Royal Cambodian

Armed Forces was

not truly a national army.

International Response

The

international response to

Hun

Sen's coup lacked coherence. The United States

757
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suspended

Policy

but the humanitarian assistance portion of

all

tance program.

Germany followed

aid but quickly

resumed

World Bank,

citing

1998 were

its

to

assis-

provide aid to Cambodia but also stated

The

critical.

Monetary Fund and the
comply with a
coup, suspended aid and a

International

government corruption and Cambodia's

structural adjustment

$38 million foreign

and Japan, Cambodia's largest donor, suspended

France continued

it.

that credible elections in

suit,

program, rather than referring

to the

failure to

$120 million IMF loan package. 8
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) condemned the coup and
together
postponed Cambodia's pending membership until after elections. ASEAN
with an informal diplomatic grouping known as the Friends of Cambodia, which in-

—

cluded Australia, China, France, India, Russia, and the United States

and the exiled
the exiles

come
Cambodia so

political leaders to

would

could be "free,

return to

fair,

— urged Hun Sen

an agreement on the conditions under which

to

that the national elections scheduled for

1998

and credible." 9

September 1997, the United Nations accreditation committee decided that
in the General Assembly should remain vacant. By leaving it empty,
the UN withheld its recognition of the new government in Phnom Penh, a significant
In

Cambodia's seat

victory for the leaders in exile.

The United Nations

also played an important role in

attempting to arrange for the return of the exiled political leaders by securing from

Sen guarantees

for their safety and freedom.

The

UN provided

Hun

international monitors to

help protect returning political leaders.

The

UCD

in exile received support

from the international community, including the

U.S. -based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI). 10 This assistance
stay together long

enough

to

was designed

develop a strategy for negotiating

sure from the international community, the

Hun Sen regime

its

to

enable the

UCD

Under

pres-

return.

to

agreed to several of the

opposition's demands; if the exiles returned there would be guarantees for their safety,
international assistance for

new

elections,

and

UN

monitors to help ensure the election's

fairness.

New

elections

were eventually scheduled

for July 1998.

Coaxed back from

exile

by

the international donors in the aftermath of the coup, the opposition agreed to partici-

pate in an election in

which the playing

field

was

far

from

level.

UN human rights

monitors, for example, continued to document numerous instances of violence and
intimidation directed against opposition supporters in Cambodia's rural countryside.

Khmer Nation
ber.

Party leader

11

Sam Rainsy returned to the country briefly in late NovemFUNCINPEC, the BLDP, and the KNP returned in Janu-

Leaders and supporters of

ary and February.

Hun Sen

threatened Prince Ranariddh with prosecution for smuggling weapons and

colluding with the outlawed
to stand for election.

Under

Khmer Rouge.

If convicted,

he would have been ineligible

the terms of a Japanese-brokered agreement, however, the

prince was tried in absentia, received a royal pardon, and returned to

Cambodia

in late

March.
In the

months before the

elections,

Sam Rainsy and

Prince Ranariddh threatened on

several occasions to pull their parties out of the election unless several conditions

were

met, including a cease-fire in the ongoing fighting in the northwest, fair access to

broadcast media, dismantling of pro-government militia in the provinces, reestablishing
the National Election

Commission (NEC), and convening
demands were never met,

Nevertheless, even though their

152

the Constitutional Council.

they stayed in the race.

The 1998

On

Elections:

July 26, 1998,

A Flawed

Hun

Sen's

Climate and Framework

CPP

prevailed at the polls by winning an absolute majority

of the parliamentary seats, with some 42 percent of the ballots cast. Together, the two

major opposition

parties, the National

Front

FUNCINPEC

and the

Sam Rainsy

Party,

received 45 percent (31 percent and 14 percent, respectively). This translated into 64
seats for the

CPP, 43 for

FUNCINPEC, and

15 for the

and domestic election observers praised the process as
ertheless, the opposition rejected the electoral results,

irregularities"

Viewed

Sam Rainsy
it

Party. International

unfolded on election day. Nev-

claiming that fraud and "serious

robbed them of their victory.

Cambodia

in its entirety, the election process in

norms. 12 As agreed by virtually

all

fell far

short of democratic

international and domestic observers, the voting

process itself was generally well administered and the atmosphere on election day was
largely peaceful. In the face of serious obstacles, the

Cambodian people turned

high numbers on election day. But while balloting and

initial

went

institutional

relatively well, both the political climate

elections

and the

out in

stages of the vote count

framework

for the

were highly flawed.

Environment in Pre-election Period
months leading up to the 1998 elections, violence and intimidation plagued Cambodia. After the July 1997 coup, dozens of opposition members of Parliament and party

Political

In the

leaders fled the country in fear for their lives.

Cambodian

human

and the

monitoring groups,

rights organizations,

political parties, election

UN

Center for

Human

Rights

documented the systematic and widespread political intimidation and violence that
plagued the pre-election environment. The UN documented dozens of politically motivated summary executions, and "disappearances," following the July 1997 coup. 13 The

UN

special representative for

human

rights submitted reports to the

Cambodian govern-

ment, but no action was taken by Cambodian officials to apprehend those responsible
for

human

rights violations.

In the aftermath of the coup, second

prime minister Hun Sen and the

the infrastructures of opposition political parties. During the

was

in exile,

Hun Sen and

CPP were

the

months

CPP

dismantled

that the opposition

able to campaign without competition.

Cambodia

When

months before the
1998 election, they had to operate within a framework designed and dominated by the
CPP. Opposition parties were not given sufficient time to rebuild their party membership networks, and CPP resources dwarfed those of the opposition. Prince Ranariddh
attracted large crowds when he campaigned in provincial capitals, but reports of politiopposition leaders were later allowed to return to

cal violence directed against opposition party

After the July 1997 coup, the
further consolidate

its

CPP

workers

in the

in the rural countryside persisted.

took advantage of the opposition's absence to

control over the military, security forces, civil administration,

and media. The media limited

their

campaign period. News coverage of

coverage of opposition candidates throughout the
rallies,

speeches, and other campaign events was

heavily biased toward the ruling party. Moreover, limited access to broadcast media

impeded the

ability

of opposition parties to reach potential voters and gave the

substantial advantage.

one five-minute
parties,

slot

the thirty-nine registered political parties

CPP

a

was allowed

per day. This diluted the media access of the two major opposition

FUNCINPEC

parties that

Each of
and the

Sam Rainsy

had no prior history and

little

Party,

which received no more time than the

demonstrable public support.
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Framework

institutional framework lacked the credibility necessary for democratic
The process of enacting the election law and regulations and of establishing
National Election Commission and Constitutional Council effectively ensured rul-

and

legal

elections.

the

ing party control of election administration and dispute resolution. Those institutions

had

little

credibility with

much

of the public and the international community

when

they addressed the election disputes that later arose.

Furthermore, the opposition had no opportunity to participate in the development of
the election law or the appointment of the bodies to oversee the elections and resolve
disputes.

While opposition members of Parliament and other

in exile, the

Cambodian People's

political leaders

were

still

Party controlled the National Assembly and enacted

NEC members.
which the members of the National Election Commission were selected
raised serious questions about its independence and ultimately its credibility. Under the
the election law and appointed the

The way

new

in

election law, the

eleven-member

the parties represented in theNational

were given

seats

NEC

was to include representatives from each of
Assembly and from the NGO sector. But party

to ruling party-backed factions of opposition parties. In addition,

leaders questioned the impartiality of the

The

Constitutional Council, which

constitutional

NGO

NGO

representative.

was supposed

to function as the final arbiter

of

and election-related disputes, was not properly constituted. CPP-ap-

pointed members controlled the Constitutional Council, and the council failed to meet
in the pre-election period to address serious

As

previously noted, the

Cambodian

and fundamental election-related disputes.

Constitution requires the support of two-thirds

of the members of Parliament to form a government. Thus, the party receiving a plurality

or even a majority had to obtain the support of one or

CPP, then, had

to

FUNCINPEC

form a government with

Ranariddh was asked by

Hun Sen

to participate in the

The combined opposition received
and the

Sam

substantially

The

Rainsy Party, and
prince

crisis.

more votes than

the

CPP. If

Rainsy Party had merged before the elections they would

have garnered a plurality and had the right
over, because the

the other parties.

Sam

new government. The

refused for several months, precipitating a constitutional

FUNCINPEC

more of
or the

new government needed

to designate the

new prime

minister.

More-

a two-thirds vote of confidence from the

Assembly members, the opposition had the power to deny the
form a government in accordance with the Constitution. Neither
event occurred. The opposition, effectively unable to collaborate on a strategy, seemingly was politically paralyzed.

recently elected National

CPP

the ability to

Problems

in the Post-Election

Period

After the elections, the National Front
ted approximately
things,

FUNCINPEC

800 formal complaints

to the

and the

NEC. They

problems with the vote count, including the

fact that

intimidated and denied access to the count. In response, the

Sam Rainsy
alleged,

Party submit-

among

other

many party agents were
NEC, between July 30 and

August 4, conducted a recount in eight of the country's fifteen hundred communes. On
August 5 an NEC spokesperson claimed that the alleged problems were not substantiated and announced that the commission was ceasing all operations. The NEC also
refused to provide official rejection notices to the complainants. This, in turn, jeopar-

dized the parties' ability to take some complaints to the Constitutional Council.
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.

The Constitutional Council refused

to accept

sition party agents, alleged electoral fraud,

cated.

were

stated that these complaints

It

filed before the deadline.

NEC's

with the

The

complaints about intimidation of oppo-

and the formula by which

seals

by the

either formally rejected

were

NEC

allo-

or not

council's refusal to consider these complaints, coupled

failure to provide the required rejection notices, foreclosed any

mean-

ingful opportunity for appeal.

On

the day following the election, a controversy involving the formula for allocating

National Assembly seats erupted. Versions of the electoral regulations published on

May

6 and

May

25 clearly indicated that one particular formula would be used. These

regulations were not
tives.

marked

After a meeting of the

ing that date,

was

and were widely circulated

as drafts

NEC

on

May

circulated in early June.

to party representa-

29, another version of the regulations, carryIt

subsequently

become

clear

records and from the accounts of individual commissioners that the

new

cussed nor properly adopted a

No

formula, but the

new

from

NEC

NEC

neither dis-

regulations included the

was made
no one from the opposition parties,
domesticmonitoring groups, international observer organizations, and the diplomatic
community was aware that a change had been made. The new formula gave the CPP
five additional seats, compared with what the ruling party would have received under
change.

particular effort, such as a letter to parties or a press statement,

to

highlight this significant alteration, and evidently

was

the previous formula. This
the

new

sufficient to provide the

There was evidence that
trying to correct

NEC

advisers, in adopting the

what they believed

allegations of fraud in the balloting

enough
the

CPP

with a majority, 64 seats in

122-seat National Assembly.

in their totality to

NEC

to

new

formula, were merely

be a technical mistake. The opposition's other

and counting did not appear

to

be significant

have affected the overall outcome of the election. But since

and the Constitutional Council were seen as lacking independence,

their re-

sponses to the opposition's complaints were viewed with suspicion by the press,

bodian

NGOs,

the

Cambodian

public,

Cam-

and the international community.

Violence and Intimidation after the Elections

and violence resumed after the elections. Grenade attacks on Hun Sen's
compound, the violent suppression of street demonstrations, and the killing and disappearance of opposition figures formed the backdrop to the pending negotiations on the
formation of the government. Chaos threatened to take hold as ruling and opposition
Instability

party leaders jockeyed for position in advance of discussions about whether, and on

what terms, FUNCINPEC would join the government.
On September 8, the government issued the first of two orders that prohibited about
300 people, including all the new opposition members of Parliament, all outgoing opposition MPs, and several FUNCINPEC senior civil servants, from leaving the country.
The ban was justified as a means of keeping suspects allegedly involved in grenade
attacks and demonstrations in the country. The UN Human Rights Center condemned
this travel ban as a violation of the Cambodian Constitution, the fundamental right to
freedom of travel, and an express commitment of the Cambodian government to the UN
secretary-general

The post-election chaos,

initiated

by demands

complaints, might well have been avoided

if

for an investigation of election-related

had been credible and functioning
But the institutions charged with re-

there

institutions to administer the grievance process.

sponsibility to resolve disputes largely failed to effectively address the opposition's

concerns.
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Domestic and International Observers
Domestic and international election observer groups performed an important

role during

judgment on the election would be influential in determining
whether the elections would be considered legitimate by the international community,

the election period. Their

thereby allowing foreign aid to resume, permitting the vacant
seat to

be

and reopening membership

filled,

toring groups

—

Free Elections (NICFEC)

(COMFREL), and

—

UN

ASEAN. Three

General Assembly

national election moni-

and Fair Elections (COFFEL), the Committee

the Coalition on Free

on Free and Fair Elections

in

the Neutral and Impartial

carried out ambitious and effective

Committee

programs

voters and to monitor the balloting and counting processes. Local groups
in

to

for

educate

were

essential

monitoring and reporting on the pre-election violence, intimidation, and institutional

proceedings. Domestic monitors were present at most of the nation's 12,000
pollingstations

COMFREL,

and fewer counting

NICFEC

and

stations throughout the country.

COFFEL,

issued thoughtful and balanced statements before and after

election day.

COMFREL's
the intimidation

president,

Thun

and violence

Saray, stated

could not be considered "free and
sults

should be accepted

if

two days before polling

that,

because of

that took place in the aftermath of the coup, the election
fair."

Nevertheless, he believed that the election re-

procedures on polling day were "reasonably credible." The

domestic observers agreed that polling and counting days were generally well conducted. All three groups, however, also called on the
tial

NEC

to

conduct thorough, impar-

investigations into opposition party complaints and, in fact, offered to assist the

NEC

with such efforts. They condemned the post-election violence and called on

political actors to solve their differences peacefully.

The most prominent

international monitoring groups

Observer Group (JIOG), organized by the

UN

all

14

were the Joint International

and European Union (EU), and the del-

egation fielded jointly by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and
the International Republican Institute.

JIOG was

the larger of the two, consisting of

approximately five hundred observers representing thirty-four observer missions, including the EU,

ASEAN,

and

bilateral delegations.

ing presence in the country four
election

week of about

months before

NDI and

the election

sixty representatives, including staff

IRI established a monitor-

and fielded a delegation for

members, from

the United

States and seven other nations.

Although Cambodian press accounts emphasized perceived differences between the

two groups of observers,

their final statements

on the election were not

far apart,

nor

made by domestic observers. 15 Both
period was violent; but JIOG concluded that "what

did they differ substantially from the statements

groups noted that the pre-election

could be observed by us on polling and counting day was a process that was free and
fair to

an extent that

people." 16

it

An NDI-IRI

enables

it

to reflect, in a credible

way, the will of the Cambodian

pre-election delegation issued a statement on July 14 calling the

due to pervasive intimidation and violence.
The "preliminary" NDI-IRI post-election statement, issued on July 28, two days after
the polling, commented that the voting process was "generally well administered,"
observed that the atmosphere on election day was largely "peaceful," and applauded the
Cambodian people for turning out in such high numbers on election day. At the same
election process "fundamentally flawed"

time,

NDI

and IRI reiterated

timidation, unfair

media

their serious

concerns regarding "violence, extensive

access, and ruling party control of the administrative
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in-

machinery

ment of

that characterized the pre-election period"

the entire election process

would have

to

and cautioned

await the

that a final assess-

final tabulation

of results,

the processing of complaints, and the formation of the next government based on the
results of the elections.

To some
could

math

it

17

more question than they

extent, the observer groups raised

be determined, for example, whether the July 1997 coup and

affected voting behavior? Should any elections that

How

resolved.

its

violent after-

do not meet international

standards, because of pre-election violence, for instance, be considered unacceptable by
the international

community?

Political reality in large

conditions that
albeit

reaction of the U.S.

She

government

said,

to the elections

cautious. U.S. secretary of

participate in the life of their country without fear

have a government that uses power

until they

was

to keep pressuring the Cambodian government
"The democratic process must continue until the day

comes when Cambodians can
it

for

urged ASEAN

Madeline Albright

for furtherreforms.

ing

measure probably accounts

election

under international pressure.

The
state

An

was about to be held under
were obviously flawed. But the opposition had agreed to participate,

the international monitors' view of their role.

to uplift their

.

.

.

.

.

.

country instead of abus-

on behalf of a privileged few." 18

Negotiations for a Coalition Government

Much

of the international community pressured Prince Ranariddh to return to negotiate

the National Front

November

1

2, at

try to resolve the

FUNCINPEC's

participation in the

Cambodian government. On
Phnom Penh

the insistence of King Sihanouk, Ranariddh returned to

impasse

that

to

had prevented the formation of a government based on

the results of the July elections.

FUNCINPEC

and the Cambodian People's Party

quickly agreed to form a coalition government and to establish a

new upper house

of

become president of the National Assembly,
and CPP stalwart Chea Sim would become head of the new senate, which would also
make him head of state in the absence of the king. The parties agreed on co- deputy
Parliament and senate. Ranariddh would

prime ministers, one from
ministries.
ters.

The

The important

CPP

and one from

FUNCINPEC, and

ministries of interior

and defense would also have co-minis-

parties also split the nine parliamentary committees, four each for

FUNCINPEC

and

CPP

and one for the

Sam

Rainsy Party.

In light of the agreement to form a government,
its

dividing government

seat at the

UN

and

to

be admitted

to

Cambodia was expected

to reclaim

ASEAN.

Cambodia's coalition government, put into place following the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia-conducted elections of 1993, failed the test of time. Despite massive aid from the international community
$1.5 billion for UNTAC and

—

pledges of $1.3 billion in post-election assistance over the next five years
cratic impetus the elections provided could not

ceeded

in

—

be sustained. The elections

the

demo-

suc-

Khmer Rouge, but the animosity between the coalition
new government persisted. Immediately following the 1993 elections,

marginalizing the

partners of the

neither of the coalition partners could rule alone.
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port of the civil bureaucracy, police, courts, and

under

CPP

control.

The CPP, on

much

of the military, which remained

the other hand, lacked international legitimacy and,

having received only 38 percent of the

total vote, also

lacked a substantial segment of

domestic public support.
Initially, this

The

mutual reliance was sufficient

failed to take root.

to hold the coalition intact.

have supported the new democratic dispensation, however,

institutions that could

The National Assembly,

for instance, never developed the capacity to

check on the executive branch; the press, on the whole, remained

act as an independent

highly partisan, and opposition newspapers were subject to harassment and intimida-

made

tion; civil society

to develop

Sen correctly sensed
assistance

—

first to

new government

had neither

substantial gains, but

and mobilize domestic

sufficient time nor resources

Moreover,

political constituencies for reform.

Hun

community, already fatigued by years of
the refugees who fled after the Vietnamese invasion and then to the
that the international

— longed

for stability rather than

democracy. Lacking international

and domestic constraints, the looming prospect of defeat

at the polls led

Hun Sen

to

violently overthrow his coalition partner.

The 1998

elections merely affirmed the post-coup status quo. Despite the obstacles

had been put

that

made a

in their path, the opposition

respectable showing.

It is

had mounted a vigorous campaign and

impossible to

know how much

better the political

opposition might have done had the playing field been level. The pre-election period

was

short and violent, though perhaps less violent than during the 1993

But unlike the 1993

tions.

elections, there

were no

UN peacekeepers

to

UNTAC

elec-

inform voters

were secret and their safety assured. In the post-coup environment, the
were heavily weighted in favor of the CPP, and the elections were therefore fun-

that their ballots

scales

damentally flawed regardless of

how

well the polls were administered on election day.

might be drawn from the Cambodian

In retrospect, there are a few lessons that

UNTAC

—

trag-

months between March 1992 and September 1993
was too short to establish the framework for a lasting democracy. After
thirty years of civil war, the trauma of Khmer Rouge rule, and Vietnamese occupation, a
more sustained effort was needed. The 1993 elections left the power relationships between the major parties unchanged despite the CPP's electoral defeat. UNTAC failed to
demobilize the military forces of FUNCINPEC and the CPP and did not establish a
edy.

First, the

—

period

the eighteen

"neutral political environment" before the election. After the election, efforts to neutralize

and professionalize the

civil

bureaucracy, courts, and police might have helped to

redress the imbalance, but such efforts were precluded by
ture.
ties,

UNTAC,
was

with

its

in the best position to

undertake these post-election

Second, when, by the spring of 1997,
the situation

was

UNTAC 's

premature depar-

wide-ranging mandate and relative acceptability by

it

was

— by threatening sanctions or
Peace conference —
ensure
the
to

that

community should have taken

aid cutoffs or even by reconvening the Paris

Paris

Peace Accords were observed. The

national donors, however, appeared to believe that placing pressure on

inter-

Hun Sen would

be inherently destabilizing. In the context of Cambodia's highly polarized

was

the par-

clear that a political impasse existed and

deteriorating rapidly, the international

firmer steps

all

activities.

society,

how-

Only a more democratic Cambodia, where each of the parties felt that they could fairly and peacefully compete for power, could lead to a
measure of stability. It was only after the grenade attack on Sam Rainsy's demonstration in April 1 997 that the international community became more assertive in its calls
for reform, and by then it was too late.
ever, the opposite

true.
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Third, the 1998 elections should have been delayed until the conditions for meaningful

democratic elections had been met. The political opposition had neither the time nor

organizational resources to compete fairly in the 1998 elections.

As mentioned earlier,
damage done to

they were forced to contest the election before being able to repair the
their organizations

by the 1997 coup. Furthermore, their workers were harassed and

intimidated and access to government-controlled electronic media

was

severely re-

stricted.

Elections have not brought democracy or stability to Cambodia.

needed

clearly

and changing the

political culture to

one

in

which

all

people, too, must internalize the

norms of

political tolerance

for a democratic polity. Nevertheless, elections

No

The Cambodian

and compromise necessary

remain an essential feature of democ-

meaningful, sustainable political reconciliation will take place

parties agree to a
will of the

is

contending parties recognize that

they are subject to lawful and democratically adopted constraints.

racy.

Much more

in the areas of institutional development, establishing the rule of law,

framework

for the peaceful

and

fair transfer

until all the

of power based on the

Cambodian people. 5*

Notes
There are several thorough accounts of the UNTAC period and the 1993 elections.
See, for example, Michael Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The
Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 995); Frederick Z.
Brown, "Cambodia's Rocky Venture in Democracy," in Krishna Kumar, ed.,
Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance (Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); James A. Schear, "Riding the Tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia's Struggle for Peace," in William J. Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping,
American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1996), 135-191.
2. UN document A/46/608, S/23177, Annex 5, October 30, 1991, 8-47. The UN
docu ments may also be found in the Appendix of Findlay, Cambodia, 171-207.
3. Schear, "Riding the Tiger," 176-177.
4. On UNTAC's mandate, see ibid., 142-143.
5. See Findlay, Cambodia, 81.
6. See Chapter VII, Article 90 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (adopted
September 24, 1993), supplied by the embassy of the Kingdom of Cambodia in the
1.

United States.

See "NEC Investigates Allegations of Fraud," Phnom Penh Post!, no. 16 (July 31August 6, 1998): 1.
8. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 82.
9. David W. Ashley, "The Failure of Conflict Resolution in Cambodia," in Cambodia and
the International Community (New York: Asia Society, 1998, 64).
10. NDI and IRI issued two reports during this period. See Restoring Democracy in Cambodia: The Difficult Road Ahead (Washington, D.C.: NDI-IRI, August 29,1997); The
Continuing Crisis in Cambodia: Obstacles to Democratic Elections (Washington, D.C.:
NDI-IRI, January 30, 1998).
11. See "Cambodia: Fair Elections Not Possible," Human Rights Watch Report 10, no. 4
(June 1998).
12. The norms largely accepted by the international community can be found in Guy S.

7.

Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections: International

Law and

Practice (Geneva: Inter-

994); Carl W. Dundas, Dimensions of Free and Fair Elections:
Frameworks, Integrity, Transparency, Attributes, Monitoring (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1994); UN Centre for Human Rights, Human Rights and

Parliamentary Union,

1

159

New England Journal

of Public Policy

A Handbook on the Legal, Technical, and Human Rights Aspects of Elec(New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1994).
13. See Memorandum to the Royal Government of Cambodia, submitted by the special
representative of the United Nations secretary-general for human rights in Cambodia
(Phnom Penh: UN Centre for Human Rights, May 13, 1998).
14. See Kay Johnson, "Group Says That Poll Could Be Credible — Not Fair," Cambodia
Daily 13, issue 43 (Sunday, July 26, 1998): 1, 9.
15. See, for example, Matthew Granger, "International Observers Taking a Tougher
Public Stance in Days before Polling," Phnom Penh Post, July 24-30,1998, 10.
The article argues that JIOG toughened its pre-election day statement in response
to NDI- IRI criticisms that past JIOG statements had ignored the effects of Hun
Sen's July 1997 coup. See also Matthew Granger, "Former Ambassador Says His
Observers Will Balance US Opinion," Phnom Penh Post, July 24-30,1998, 4.
16. Jeff Smith, "JIOG Says Poll, Tally, 'Free, Fair,'" Cambodia Daily, July 28, 1998, 1,
Elections:
tions

11.
1

7.

See Preliminary Statement of the IRI-NDI Delegation to the July 16, 1998, Elections
in Cambodia, press statement available from NDI and IRI offices in Washington,
D.C.

18. Madeline Albright, quoted
Daily, July 29,

1998,

in

"Albright Urges

8.

160

ASEAN

to Press

Cambodia," Cambodia

